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Sovereignty

Most platforms talk about sovereignty as a deployment posture — where the compute and storage live. Kilimanjaro treats sovereignty as a structural property: where data lives, who holds the keys, who can compel access, and who holds the audit trail. This guide walks through the model end-to-end and the structural decisions that compose into a sovereign posture for a given project.

1. Sovereign Stack vs Sovereign Cloud​

Sovereign Cloud — OVHcloud, T-Systems, Bleu, Gaia-X-aligned providers — refers to the IaaS layer: compute, storage, and network within a chosen jurisdiction. Kilimanjaro is not Sovereign Cloud. It is the Sovereign Stack — the integrated platform layer above sovereign-cloud substrate, where data + security + control + compute + identity compose under one customer-controllable boundary.

The relationship is complementary: the Stack runs on sovereign cloud (Hetzner-EU and OVH sovereign-region substrates); it is not itself sovereign cloud. Customers evaluating Kilimanjaro against an existing sovereign-cloud vendor are comparing different layers — the Stack consumes that substrate; it competes with multi-vendor stacks built on it.

No existing platform category holds all four customer roles — developer (BaaS), governance (Vault/IAM/SecOps), business-author (no-code/low-code), business-consumer (BI/analytics) — first-class without compromising on sovereignty or integration. Kilimanjaro is built around that gap.

2. The three structural decisions​

A project's sovereignty posture is determined by three immutable-or-bidirectional decisions made at project creation:

DecisionFieldMutabilityEffect
Region pinregionImmutableWhere the data plane lives — compute + storage in a chosen jurisdiction
Custody modecustodyModeBidirectional with attestationWho holds the encryption keys protecting the data — Platform-Managed / SKR (integrity) / BYOK / HYOK
Control plane region(org-level)ImmutableWhere the org's metadata + audit log + admin Console lives — always distinct from data-plane regions

Region pin and control-plane region are immutable for structural sovereignty reasons covered in Regions & residency. Custody mode is bidirectional because it concerns key location not data location — the same data can be re-keyed across custody modes without moving.

3. The custody ladder​

Custody mode determines who holds the keys and under what constraints. Platform-Managed and SKR (Secure Key Release) are both platform-custody modes (Kibo holds the key); SKR is the integrity mode that restricts key release to only your own verified, attested code. BYOK (Bring Your Own Key) and HYOK (Hold Your Own Key) are the sovereignty modes where Kibo never holds the plaintext key.

ModeWhere the keys liveOperational shape
PLATFORM_MANAGEDKibo's platform-managed vault; per-project key is a software-protected secret in a region-pinned vault; DEKs used in-process and zeroized after useDefault; no customer-side infrastructure needed; platform handles rotation + recovery
SKRPlatform-managed enclave; Kibo holds the key but releases it only to your own verified, attested codeThe integrity mode — your keys reach only your verified code. Key material is still platform-side; Kibo must hold it to enforce the attestation gate. This is not sovereignty (that is BYOK / HYOK)
BYOKCustomer-supplied key material in cloud KMS — AWS KMS, GCP Cloud KMS, Azure Key Vault, or HashiCorp VaultCustomer controls key lifecycle; the platform never holds the key material; per Kibo BYOK provisioning flow
HYOKCustomer-owned HSM cluster on customer infrastructureMaximum sovereignty; key material never leaves the customer's HSM; per Kibo HYOK provisioning flow
platform custody: Kibo holds the keysovereignty: Kibo never holds the plaintext keyPLATFORM_MANAGEDKibo's platform vault,region-pinnedSKRplatform enclave;released only to yourattested codeBYOKcustomer key incloud KMS orHashiCorp VaultHYOKcustomer-owned HSMcluster; key neverleaves the HSMupgrade (lower to higher custody): no friction beyond the new mode's onboardingdowngrade (higher to lower custody): admin attestation through IRREVERSIBLE_ACTION_GATE
Custody climbs from platform-held keys to customer-held keys; moving down the ladder is the gated direction.

Upgrade transitions (lower → higher custody) run without operational friction beyond the new mode's onboarding. Downgrade transitions (higher → lower custody) require admin attestation through the IRREVERSIBLE_ACTION_GATE policy family per Control. The friction is deliberate — moving keys from a stronger custody mode to a weaker one should be a conscious decision, not an accident.

Climbing the ladder does not require redeployment or code change. The SDK shape is identical across modes; the difference is structural at the encryption boundary.

4. Jurisdictional ingress​

Region pin governs where data lives. Jurisdictional ingress governs who can authenticate against the project from where. Per-region access controls compose against the data-layer auto-scoping the gateway applies to end-user JWTs:

Decision pointAuthored as
Region allowlist / blocklistInclusive or exclusive list of ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country codes — controls which jurisdictions can issue tokens
Per-region MFA elevationRegions that require step-up MFA even for users without an enrolled MFA factor
Per-region session policyTighter idle / absolute session timeouts for sensitive jurisdictions
Per-region audit alertingConfigurable webhook trigger on sign-in from a flagged region (e.g., SIEM alerting on novel-region access)

Jurisdictional ingress is authored through Gate Studio as visual policy graphs; the underlying policy expressions live in the project's JSON policy.

5. Audit trail sovereignty​

Every API call emits an audit event. The audit log is itself a sovereignty surface:

  • Hot tier (90-day default retention) lives in the project's data-plane region — same jurisdiction as the data the events describe.
  • Cold tier (up to 7-year retention) tiers to long-term archival in the same jurisdiction unless the customer's compliance regime explicitly requires cross-jurisdiction storage.
  • SIEM forwarding delivers events to a customer-supplied endpoint via HMAC-signed webhook — the customer's external observability surface lives wherever the customer chooses; the platform's delivery contract is the same regardless of destination.
  • Forensic attribution. Every end-user identity event (data.write.auth.* family) captures the actual identity of both the actor and the affected end-user, with the identity established by Gate's cryptographic session at the kernel before the response returns. PII column values are excluded from the audit envelope; field names appear, field values do not — audit-channel PII-tightness without losing forensic depth.

The forensic-attribution property is what distinguishes Kilimanjaro's audit surface from a generic platform-side audit log: the per-event identity binding is platform-signed at the kernel rather than reconstructed from application logs after the fact.

6. Verifying sovereignty​

Sovereignty claims are testable, not just declarative. The platform exposes verification surfaces:

VerificationSurface
Region pinGET <orgSlug>.api.k9o.io/@<projectSlug> returns the project's region; cross-region read attempts fail at the gateway before any data access
Custody attestationGET <orgSlug>.api.k9o.io/@<projectSlug>/custody returns the active custody mode + the key-material provenance chain (for SKR and above)
Audit-log signatureHot-tier and cold-tier exports carry a cryptographic chain — each event's eventId references the prior event's hash, forming a tamper-evident sequence
Compliance reportsSOC 2 / ISO 27001 / similar attestation reports are surfaced through the Console under the project's compliance section — request via your account team

Third-party attestation is the binding for the audit-log signature: the cryptographic chain alone isn't sufficient if the platform itself signs both ends; the platform-side audit-log chain is anchored against an external transparency log (configurable per project) for cross-platform verification.

7. The four-persona coverage claim​

Sovereignty alone isn't the differentiator — sovereign-cloud vendors offer sovereign substrate without the integrated stack above. Kilimanjaro's distinct positioning is:

Customer roleSurface
Developer (Architect)The four-pillar API surface — Data, Security, Control, Compute
Governance (Warden)Audit log + RBAC + JSON-policy + custody mode + jurisdictional ingress
Business-author (Pathmaker)Console authoring surfaces — Paperless workflows, Gate Studio login pages and Maker-Checker flows, Lookout dashboards
Business-consumer (Scout)Paperless mobile workspace (chat with agents + workflow captures), embedded dashboards (Lookout), Workspace-mode Console for PROJECT_ANALYST callers

No platform in the reference set covers all four first-class without forcing trade-offs. Sovereignty + integrated multi-persona coverage compose into the structural category Kilimanjaro is built around.

8. See also​