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Compliance

Kilimanjaro's compliance posture is shaped by two structural choices: data + key sovereignty as a first-class property (per Guides → Sovereignty) and a platform-signed audit chain (per Guides → Observability). Both reduce the surface area a compliance attestation needs to cover — the structural guarantees compose with the regulatory framework's controls rather than being implemented from scratch per framework.

This page surfaces Kilimanjaro's compliance posture. Specifics evolve as attestation cycles complete; for the authoritative current state and to request attestation reports, contact your account team.

1. Compliance frameworks​

Kilimanjaro maintains ongoing programmes for the major regulatory and industry frameworks customers in regulated industries recognise:

FrameworkScopeStatus
SOC 2 Type IIService-organisation controls — security, availability, processing integrity, confidentiality, privacyOngoing
ISO 27001Information-security management system — Annex A controlsOngoing
GDPR / UK GDPREU + UK personal-data protection; data-processor obligationsOngoing
HIPAAUS healthcare-data protection; Business Associate Agreement available for customers requiring HIPAA-covered workloadsOngoing
FedRAMPUS federal cloud-security authorisation; Moderate baselineOngoing

The "ongoing" status means: the platform's controls are designed to map onto the framework's requirements; documented evidence of those controls is being prepared; the formal attestation cycle is underway. Customers who require formal attestation before adopting the platform should surface the requirement to their account team — pre-attestation customer-attestable evidence is available for many controls.

Additional frameworks for jurisdiction-specific or industry-specific compliance (NDPA for Nigeria, LGPD for Brazil, PCI DSS for payment workloads, ISO 27017 for cloud security, ISO 27018 for cloud privacy) are surfaced on request through your account team — alignment scope and attestation status vary by framework.

2. How compliance composes with sovereignty​

Many compliance frameworks have data-residency requirements (GDPR Article 44 cross-border transfer rules, HIPAA's data-protection requirements, FedRAMP authorisation boundary). Kilimanjaro's structural sovereignty model addresses these at the platform layer rather than per-application:

  • Region pin — every project pins to a jurisdiction at creation, immutable thereafter. Data does not cross regions without an audited, opt-in mechanism per Regions & residency.
  • Custody mode — three custody modes (Platform-Managed / BYOK (Bring Your Own Key) / HYOK (Hold Your Own Key)) let the customer choose who holds the encryption keys. BYOK and HYOK customers hold key material outside the platform entirely, retaining key-rotation control independently of platform operations. SKR (Secure Key Release) is a separate attestation-gated overlay on Platform-Managed — it does not change who holds the key (Kibo still does), but restricts key release to only your own verified, attested code; it is an integrity overlay, not a peer custody mode.
  • Audit-log retention — 90-day hot tier + up to 7-year cold tier per project, retention configurable per the org's compliance regime. Audit retention is the same for every project.

For frameworks where the residency requirement is jurisdiction-specific (FedRAMP US-only authorisation boundary, GDPR EU-data-EU-residency), the project's region pin satisfies the structural requirement; the framework's other controls (access management, change management, incident response) are platform-side and surfaced through the attestation report.

3. How compliance composes with the audit surface​

Most compliance frameworks require evidence of access control and change tracking. Kilimanjaro's audit log is the evidence surface:

  • Every API call appears in the audit log with calling identity, resource touched, and outcome — before the response returns to the caller.
  • Forensic attribution at the kernel captures the actual identity of both the actor and the affected end-user with cryptographic (platform-signed) attribution.
  • The cryptographic audit chain provides tamper-evident structural integrity, anchored against an external transparency log for cross-platform verification.
  • SIEM forwarding delivers events to the customer's external observability surface for retention beyond the platform's defaults and for cross-system correlation.

For framework controls that require evidence of access control (SOC 2 CC6, ISO 27001 A.9, HIPAA §164.312(a)(1)), the audit log surfaces the per-call evidence at the granularity the auditor needs. Customers preparing for their own attestation cycles compose their evidence package against the Kilimanjaro audit-log export.

4. Customer responsibilities​

The platform's compliance posture covers the platform itself — the shared responsibility for the customer's application varies by framework:

FrameworkPlatform responsibilityCustomer responsibility
SOC 2Platform controls + audit-trail evidence + change-managementCustomer's application logic + customer-managed user data + customer-side observability
GDPRData-processor obligations + sub-processor disclosure + DPA templateData-controller obligations + lawful basis for processing + data-subject rights workflows
HIPAAPlatform technical safeguards + Business Associate AgreementCustomer's covered-entity obligations + workforce training + risk assessment
ISO 27001Platform-side ISMS controlsCustomer's own ISMS scope (typically excludes the platform layer when the platform itself is certified)
FedRAMPPlatform authorisation boundaryCustomer's application authorisation; tenant-level controls

The shared-responsibility split is standard for platform-as-a-service compliance arrangements; the platform-side scope evolves as attestation cycles complete.

5. Customer-attestable evidence​

Pre-formal-attestation, the platform makes customer-attestable evidence available through your account team:

  • Architecture diagrams + data-flow documentation
  • Access-control policy + RBAC role-taxonomy enumeration
  • Audit-log retention configuration + sample audit-log exports
  • Custody mode + key-rotation configuration (for BYOK / HYOK customers)
  • Sub-processor disclosures + transfer-mechanism documentation (for GDPR)
  • Incident-response policy + breach-notification commitments
  • Encryption-at-rest + encryption-in-transit configuration

This evidence is sufficient for many customers' internal vendor-risk-management processes; formal attestation reports (SOC 2 Type II report, ISO 27001 certificate, etc.) become available as the attestation cycles complete.

6. Requesting reports​

To request a compliance attestation report, an executed Business Associate Agreement, a Data Processing Addendum, or other compliance artefact, contact your account team or support. Reports are released under NDA where the underlying attestation contract requires it; the request flow is platform-side, not self-serve.

For customers without an existing account team contact, the platform's pricing surface describes usage-based pricing. Compliance artefacts are requested through the same flow for every project.

7. Field-level encryption and the at-rest data-protection control​

Most data-protection frameworks converge on the same at-rest requirement: sensitive data must be rendered unreadable wherever it is stored, and full-disk encryption alone does not satisfy it — a caller with a valid query connection still reads plaintext, which is the access path that matters. Kilimanjaro meets this at the field, not the disk: field-level encryption and vault tokenization render a designated column unreadable under the project key, and cryptographic erasure makes that protection provably revocable.

The PCI DSS case is the one "by construction" claim. PCI DSS 4.0 §3.5.1 requires the PAN to be rendered unreadable anywhere it is stored, and §3.5.1.2 makes disk- or partition-level encryption insufficient on its own (allowed only for removable media, otherwise an additional §3.5.1 method is required). Mode-D vault tokenization is that method: the real PAN moves into the Kibo vault and only a non-reversible token remains in the row — so the customer database holds no account data and is out of PCI scope by construction.

For every other framework, the scoped claim is narrower — Kilimanjaro implements the at-rest field-encryption control the framework calls for; it does not by itself "satisfy the framework," which always involves controls beyond encryption:

FrameworkAt-rest data-protection controlHow field encryption + tokenization maps
PCI DSS 4.0§3.5.1 render PAN unreadable → §3.5.1.2 (disk-level insufficient)Mode-D tokenization removes the PAN from the database → out of PCI scope by construction
HIPAA§164.312(a)(2)(iv) — encryption of ePHI at rest (addressable)Implements the at-rest encryption control for column-resident ePHI under the per-project key
GDPRArt. 32(1)(a) — encryption and pseudonymisation of personal dataImplements field-level encryption (Art. 32) and tokenization as a pseudonymisation technique for column-resident PII
GLBASafeguards Rule §314.4(c)(3) — encryption of customer NPI at restImplements the at-rest encryption element of the GLBA Safeguards Rule (§314.4(c)(3)) for NPI (SSNs, account and credit data)
NIST SP 800-53SC-28 — Protection of Information at RestImplements the SC-28 control with granular per-field encryption for sensitive columns
ISO 27001:2022Annex A.8.24 — use of cryptographyImplements the A.8.24 cryptographic control at the field level
SOC 2C1.1 — confidentiality of sensitive informationEvidences the C1.1 confidentiality control through per-field encryption under the project key
HITRUST CSFaggregates the above at-rest controlsOne field-encryption + tokenization control answers the at-rest requirement across its mapped domains

Two boundaries keep these claims accurate:

  • Regional key-pinning supports residency; it does not assert a localisation mandate. Where a framework expects data to stay in-jurisdiction, a project's region-pinned key keeps the data and its key in-region — this is how Kilimanjaro supports a residency posture, not a claim about what any framework legally mandates.
  • This is the platform-managed at-rest control, not a zero-knowledge claim. Field encryption renders data unreadable to an unauthorised caller; on the platform-custody modes Kibo holds the key. Operator-blind custody is the separate BYOK / HYOK sovereignty story.

The exhaustive per-jurisdiction mapping (including regional data-protection statutes) is maintained on the Compliance & GRC solution page; this section is the developer-facing control reference for the encryption mechanism itself.

8. See also​